Battle of Quatre Bras 1815 | The Hundred Days Part 2/4

I’ve never seen such a clear description with visual of Quatre Bras. Well done.

At the start of the campaign there were doubts among the British if the Dutch (and Belgians) would be loyal to the allies, since a lot of their officers and a quite a few of their men had served under Napoleon. At Quatre-Bras they did not only prove their loyalty, but also possibly saved Wellington's campaign. By holding the crossroads they allowed him to choose to give battle at Waterloo.

You would not believe how much I’ve searched for good videos talking about this battle! It’s all Waterloo this, Waterloo that. THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR GOING OVER THIS ENTIRE CAMPAIGN!! Can’t wait to see the next one, Gen’l O7

Those Dutch and Belgian soldiers never really got the credit they deserved for standing their ground.

Absolutely top notch! The first time an excellently told naritive put into the correct historic context with the campagne as a whole and also in a very easy to grasp way highlighting the main terrain features such as the cross roads and the Dyle river and Ligny and Brussels. It also shows i.e. provides great insight in how these wars were fought on a tactical level. Needing infantry in the nick of time needing to form square against cavalry in the fog of war. And, what happens if you don't. Also it's one of the first times to properly show the role of the Dutch together with the fact that these were veterans of Napoleons army. And shows what good commaders were worth on the field. It also show that Ney wasn't at fault. D'Erlon should have marched to the sound of the guns either to Ligny or Quatre Bras despite any orders. Seeing this I've changed my mind on the outcome. It was both a tacticle draw and strategic victory for the allies. The allies leaving the field wasn't a defeat because they moved to the chosen battle field of Waterloo which was made possible by the Dutch general Bernard and subsequent allied actions. 29:28

Golden age for digital era napoleonic content. epic history, PMF productions, Field Marshall, Historically adeaquate History, Historia Civilis and others are making L'Empereur Justice

I've always wanted to know more about Quatre Bras, and as usual this is delivered so well! I particularly like all the quotes - "To us, Belgians, to us!"

PHENOMENALLY researched in detail, without a doubt the BEST video on YouTube about this highly forgotten battle where SO Many died- the latest research showing approximately 4800 to 5600 Allied K.I.A. and for the French 4140 to 4400. Rest in Peace to the fallen on ALL sides...

Long have I wanted a video to describe the battle in detail including tactical performances from major commanders and it finally comes to fruition. Looking forward to more.

I love this. This might the first video series in youtube describing the 1815 campaign in this detail.

I can only agree with other commenters, absolutely outstanding work, I could watch this a dozen times, even though I've been obsessed with the hundreds days war for over 30 years and know an awful lot about it. Can not wait to see the next instalment. 👍🏼

This is perhaps the best video of this kind I ever watched about a Napoleonic battle so far. No exaggeration; it is marvelous work!

Excellent!! One of best videos yet. Well Done.

Congratulations! I think I have been waiting for decades for such a well researched history of the Battle of Quatre Bras,

Hi, i wanted to share some remarks. • Bad staff work is the main reason for why the right wing's advance was slow on the 15th, not bad terrain. Napoleon planned for a meticulously regulated march on the Sambre to avoid delays in the soon to be very crowded roads of the frontiers, army columns were set to march with an interval of about 30 minutes between each body, detachments of sappers accompanied the lead regiments to insure that roads would be adequate for the passage of the whole army, a cavalry screen was also sent ahead to cover said march. Problems with staff work however would hinder the advance, Vandamme's corps received their orders late, but as a result, Vandamme himself wasn't with his corps when the messenger arrived, leading the later to search for the general, during which he suffered a severe riding accident. This long delay resulted in Lobau's 6th corps to stumble into the rear columns of 3rd corps, the emperor would divert Gérard further east to avoid the congestion. As a consequence, general Pajol and his cavalry would be isolated against von Zieten, Napoleon nevertheless would assist and support Pajol with a detachment of the guard, personally led by him. • Ney didn't stop at night because he couldn't drive the allies out of Quatre Bras, he stopped for operational reasons he deemed sound. In fact, only Lefebvre-Desnouettes' forces engaged the Allies as you briefly demonstrated in the video, the former was supported by a single battalion of infantry. Ney didn't commit Reille's 2nd corps because he wanted to wait for d'Erlon's arrival first before resuming the march. And, he did have a decent idea over what Napoleon's plans were, i mean, he received orders from the emperor that afternoon to march north along the Brussels road (in which he probably mentioned Quatre Bras), during the same time in which Grouchy received his for an advance on Sombreffe. (The orders were verbal) • I was frankly disappointed to not see you mention Wellington's repeated blunders on the 15th. The duke was obsessed with the idea that Napoleon was trying to threaten his outer flank by a thrust via Mons to cut him from the sea, his repeated mobilization orders reflected this false assumption, scattering his forces with an orientation to the west of the capital, in fact, the reason why any troops at all were present at Quatre Bras to begin with was that his subordinates disobeyed their commander in chief's orders, I'll quote Chandler: [A study of the map will show the way in which the center of gravity of Wellington's army was thus being deliberately placed to the west of the Belgian capital-that is to say, a concentration was proceeding towards the outer flank-while the vital link with the Prussians to the eastward (and most particularly the key position of Quatre Bras) received no provision of troops whatsoever. In other words, instead of concentrating on the inner flank as agreed with Blücher well in advance, Wellington was ordering movements which would actually increase the distance between their two armies, and thus play straight into Napoleon's hands. It is difficult to find any convincing excuse for Wellington's miscalculation; an appreciation of French interests should have convinced the Duke that Napoleon was hardly likely to attack the open British flank, for the net result of such a move would be to drive the British in upon the Prussians, and thus cause a decidedly unfavorable preponderance of Allied strength against l'Armée du Nord. Nevertheless, such were the orders issued by Wellington on the afternoon of the 15th, and throughout the evening and night the troops set out to execute his commands...] [In none of these orders was there any mention of a force being detached to hold the crucial crossroads. That the French cavalry encountered opposition between Frasnes and Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th was entirely due to the initiative of a couple of intelligent Allied officers who were prepared to risk Wellington's wrath and disobey the letter of his orders in order to pursue a course of action they felt more justified on account of their completer knowledge of local events...] • The flurry of orders in the afternoon of the 16th are badly represented in the video. You see, Napoleon's 3:15 pm orders for Ney to join him at Ligny with his entire wing were immediately changed via a follow up 3:30 order, that's because Napoleon received at the same exact time news from Ney and that he faced more than 20,000 enemy troops. Napoleon changed his orders and asked Ney to only send d'Erlon's 1st corps to Wagnelée, in perfect position to fall on the Prussian right and rear. In addition, the orders received by d'Erlon's corps (i said corps because d'Erlon himself wasn't with it at the time) were almost certainly fabricated by de la Bedoyère, and although yes, the issue is still debated by historians, evidence in favor of the de la Bedoyère argument are far more convincing, first, when the leading troops of 1st corps started arriving close to St. Amand, Napoleon was caught by surprise, delaying the assault of the imperial guard on Blücher's center as a response, keeping them in reserve, ready to march west immediately, not knowing wether the troops were allies or enemies, that's because Napoleon ordered d'Erlon to move on Wagnelée, not St. Amand in the dispatches sent to Ney, which resulted in 1st corps joining the battle an hour earlier than expected, and in the wrong direction, de la Bedoyère probably directed the later there to avoid the loss of time in a flanking maneuver. Second, Ney was already sent orders to order d'Erlon south east, there was no need for other orders to the corps commander as well, let alone to a different location than the one written to his commander in chief. And finally, you should have mentioned the Ney-Colonel Forbin-Janson interaction, it was the most critical of the day, it is the reason for why Ney didn't understand d'Erlon's movements, and subsequently, why he asked the general to turn back and join him at Quatre Bras. Yes, Ney never read the 3:15 pm orders, if he did, then the Belgian campaign would've ended on the 16th with a decisive French victory.

Excellent video! Very details and good animations to show what is going on. Will definitely check out the other videos in this series.

What a great channel. I am glad I found it. Good, coherent and a full description of the battle with excellent graphics. Thank you for your work.

Its simple, me see that Field Marshal uploads, me press like, me see the video, me like video

Amazing well worth the wait

This is a great video Field Marshal, i am looking forward to your Waterloo video!